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INCRIMINATORY EFFECTS OF COMPLIANCE WITH IRS
SUBPOENAS FOR PERSONAL DOCUMENTS: AN ANALYSIS
OF CURRENT APPROACHES
This Note argues that creating a tax-crime exception to the privilege
against self-incrimination countervenes both the language and the spirit of
the Fifth Amendment. This Note further argues that the Ninth Circuit's cre-
ation of a tax crime-exception stemmed from a misinterpretation of prece-
dent.
This Note describes the tax system and structure of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), including its investigatory powers. The relationship between
the IRS and the Department of Justice is discussed to ascertain the incrimi-
natory effects of taxpayers' disclosures. A Ninth Circuit district court case,
United States v. Troescher, is used as a framework for analyzing the Ninth
Circuit's distinction between tax and nontax crimes. The development of the
nontax-crime exception by the Ninth Circuit is also discussed. Additionally,
this Note examines the history of the privilege against self-incrimination and
the different tests employed by the Supreme Court to determine its applica-
bility. This Note concludes by arguing that the current approach of the
Ninth Circuit is inconsistent with the underlying purposes of the Fifth
Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment provides several protections for rights of individ-
uals. One of these protections is the privilege against self-incrimination,
which is implicated when evidence sought from an individual potentially
will subject that individual to criminal liability.' The scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination encompasses not only oral testimony but also
documents.2
Tensions exist between the rights protected by the Fifth Amendment3
and the government's interest in obtaining information and evidence neces-
' U.S. CONST. amend. V; see, e.g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975);
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (involving individual investigat-
ed under registration statutes for federal wagering tax). According to the Internal Reve-
nue Service, the privilege applies to "any criminal offense." 6 Internal Revenue Manual:
Administration (CCH), at 28,679-4 (Oct. 19, 1992) [hereinafter IRM: Admin.]. Origi-
nally, it applied whenever testimony forced from a witness would result in "penalties
affixed to the criminal acts." Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1956).
2 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, the Court extended this
Fifth Amendment privilege to documents: "[W]e have been unable to perceive that the
seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is sub-
stantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself." Id. at 633.
3 See infra Part III.
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sary to law enforcement.' The government generally has a right to every
citizen's testimony.' Accordingly, compulsion of testimony6 in a noncrimi-
nal proceeding is not uniformly prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.' Be-
cause the privilege only protects individuals from incrimination for criminal
matters, an individual generally can be forced to testify against his interests
in noncriminal investigations and proceedings.8 The privilege can be assert-
ed in noncriminal proceedings if the testimony or other evidence could be
used later against the individual in a criminal matter.9
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has significant latitude in its investi-
gative proceedings. The Supreme Court traditionally has granted federal
regulatory agencies wide discretion to ensure compliance within their area of
jurisdiction." Additionally, the Internal Revenue Code grants the IRS broad
' See generally Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976) (describing the
need to balance the state's interest in obtaining incriminating evidence against individu-
als with the individual's interest in protecting his privacy). The Supreme Court has long
recognized the right of the government to obtain evidence to enforce its laws and noted
in Kastigar that "[a]mong the necessary and most important of the powers of the States
as well as the Federal Government to assure the effective functioning of government in
an ordered society is the broad power to compel residents to testify in court or before
grand juries or agencies." Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444.
' Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 364-65 (1917).
6 "Compulsion is present whenever there is a demand by a governmental officer,
agent, or tribunal for testimony or documents. The compulsion may take the form of an
administrative summons pursuant to § 7602, a grand jury subpoena, or any other offi-
cial demand for records." Compelled Production of Documents and Testimony in Tax
Examinations, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) No. 123-4th, at A-33 (Mar. 17, 1997) [hereinafter
Compelled Production].
7 Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
8 Id. at 652 (suggesting that the Internal Revenue Code encourages taxpayers to
reveal privileged information through their tax returns).
9 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444-45 (stating that the privilege "can be asserted in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory");
SEC v. Graystone Nash, Inc., 25 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege can be raised during discovery). Assertion of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege in civil proceedings is not without drawbacks, however, as adverse infer-
ences may be drawn from such an invocation. Id. at 190-93. Adverse inferences are not
allowed in criminal proceedings because in those cases the government, not a private
party, is seeking the information. Commissioner of Revenue v. Fort, 479 N.W.2d 43
(Minn. 1992).
1" Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943) (specifying broad stan-
dards for enforcement of administrative agencies' subpoenas). The Court first estab-
lished the standard for the scope of discovery of tax documents in United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). In Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Collins, 997
F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit limited the traditional deference slightly
and stated that an agency that sought to subpoena tax documents in the course of an
investigation must demonstrate a specific need before the request will be enforced. Id.
at 1233-34. The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue. For a discussion of this
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subpoena powers." At the grand jury stage of an investigation, a
taxpayer's compliance with IRS subpoenas for documents can waive the
Fifth Amendment privilege. 2 IRS investigations and subpoenas usually fo-
cus on tax returns and various financial documents. 3 Because such docu-
ments might be used later against taxpayers in criminal proceedings, those
subject to IRS investigations are entitled to claim the privilege against self-
incrimination to resist the subpoena. 4 The current test of whether this
claim is valid and will protect the taxpayer from producing such evidence is
whether the individual has a real and substantial fear of criminal prosecu-
tion.'5 The Ninth Circuit, however, has created a tax-crime exception to the
Fifth Amendment and requires an individual asserting the privilege in re-
sponse to an IRS subpoena to show fear of prosecution for a nontax
case, see Sean Doherty, Comment, Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Collins:
Is the Rationale Sound for Establishing an Exception to Subpoena Law for Tax Re-
turns?, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 365 (1995).
" See I.R.C. § 7602 (1994) (authorizing the IRS to issue summonses for purposes of
assuring the accuracy of a return, for investigating whether a return should have been
filed, and for determining an individual's tax liability); id. § 7604 (granting district
courts the power to enforce summonses issued under § 7602).
12 United States v. Penrod, 609 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1979).
13 Precedent exists for applying the Fifth Amendment to financial documents. In
Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906), a taxpayer was protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment from relinquishing his personal checkbook which contained incriminating evi-
dence. In a later case, the Supreme Court declared that criminal tax evasion could be
proved by
conduct such as keeping a double set of books, making false entries or alterations,
or false invoices or documents, destruction of books or records, concealment of
assets or covering up sources of income, handling of one's affairs to avoid mak-
ing the records usual in transactions of the kind, and any conduct, the likely effect
of which would be to mislead or to conceal.
Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943).
"' Compelled Production, supra note 6, at A-32 (Oct. 14, 1996). One commentator
described the potentially incriminating situations facing a taxpayer:
On April fifteenth of each year, a taxpayer who has violated a criminal law dur-
ing the preceding year is placed in a difficult situation. If the taxpayer reports
information required on a federal income tax return, any incriminating information
reported is admissible to prosecute the taxpayer. If the taxpayer attempts to avoid
self-incrimination by providing false answers on a return, the taxpayer commits
perjury. Finally, if the taxpayer fails to file any return at all, the taxpayer may
commit a tax crime. The taxpayer thus faces a trilemma.
Richard B. Stanley, Comment, Conflict Between the Internal Revenue Code and the
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 527, 527
(1986). It is widely accepted that the Fifth Amendment does not provide a blanket pro-
tection for taxpayers who refuse to provide any income or expense information. See,
e.g., United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973).
"5 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976); United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 1980).
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The IRS shares information with other government agencies, including
the Department of Justice (DOJ)."7 This information can include both the
tax return itself as well as other information obtained during investiga-
tions. 8 Because of the relationship between the IRS and the DOJ, a tax-
payer subject to an IRS subpoena must consider the potentially incriminat-
ing effects of information that the documents would reveal in determining
whether asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege is appropriate.
Policy considerations play a large role in resolving this issue. If taxpay-
ers are granted broad discretion to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege to
argue that the IRS should have no access to any of their documents, the
system of voluntary reporting upon which our tax system is based would be
undermined. Accordingly, taxpayers faced with incriminating themselves for
tax evasion 9 are restricted from liberally invoking the Fifth Amendment as
a blanket protection.2' Taxpayers faced with IRS investigations for other
tax crimes,2" however, should not be automatically prohibited from claim-
ing the Fifth Amendment privilege, for the governmental interest-preserva-
tion of an effective system of taxation-is not nearly as substantial in those
situations. Quite often, a taxpayer subject to an IRS investigation might fear
incriminating himself for both tax and nontax crimes because these crimes
frequently are intertwined.
This Note argues that creating a tax-crime exception to the privilege
against self-incrimination countervenes both the language and the spirit of
the Fifth Amendment. This Note further argues that the Ninth Circuit's
creation of a tax-crime exception stemmed from a misinterpretation of pre-
cedent.
Part I of this Note describes the tax system and structure of the IRS,
including its investigatory powers. The relationship between the IRS and the
DOJ is discussed to ascertain the incriminatory effects of taxpayers' disclo-
sures. Part II uses a Ninth Circuit district court case, United States v.
Troescher,"2 as a framework for analyzing the Ninth Circuit's distinction
between tax and nontax crimes. Part II also describes the development of
the nontax-crime exception by the Ninth Circuit. Part III examines the histo-
ry of the privilege against self-incrimination and the different tests employed
by the Supreme Court to determine its applicability. This Note concludes by
16 See Fuller v. United States, 786 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1986).
7 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TAx DIVISION, 1 CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL 2-10 to 2-12
(1994) [hereinafter CRIMINAL TA MANUAL].
Is Id.
'9 I.R.C. § 7203 (1994).
20 See infra Part IlI.B.
21 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7203 (willful failure to file); § 7201 (attempt to evade taxes).
No. CV 93-5736 SVW (SHX), 1995 WL 478941 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1995), va-
cated, 99 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 1996).
326 [Vol. 5:1
1996] DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS OF COMPLIANCE WITH IRS SUBPOENAS
arguing that the current approach of the Ninth Circuit is inconsistent with
the underlying purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
I. THE POTENTIAL FOR SELF-INCRIMINATION IN IRS INVESTIGATIONS
The United States' tax system is one of voluntary compliance, reliant
upon taxpayers' honesty in reporting their income.23 Many taxpayers are
not willing to assist the IRS; an IRS survey indicated that one-fifth of tax-
payers cheat on their tax returns.4 Although voluntary, the tax system pro-
vides substantial penalties for noncompliance.' IRS audit investigations of
taxpayers are directed at discovering both civil and criminal violations of tax
laws.26
A. The Internal Revenue Service
The mission of the IRS is "to collect the proper amount of tax revenues
at the least cost to the public, and in a manner that warrants the highest
degree of public confidence in the IRS's integrity, efficiency, and fair-
ness."'27 In attaining that goal, the IRS relies on voluntary compliance with
the tax laws and regulations.' Because of the "tax gap," which rose to
more than one hundred billion dollars in 1992,29 the IRS also must force
the compliance of some taxpayers through audits.
Courts give considerable deference to the IRS.3" In a proceeding for the
enforcement of an IRS summons, the government must pass the four-prong
test established in United States v. Powell.31 This requirement developed
out of an unwillingness to give the government unlimited enforcement pow-
ers. Although the Supreme Court recognized the congressional intent of
curbing "investigating powers of low-echelon revenue agents, 3 2 the Court
2 See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (holding that a taxpayer
could not invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege when she voluntarily had given her tax
records to her accountant); Rotolo v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 636 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir.
1980) (holding that dismissing an IRS employee who had cheated on her taxes was
within the IRS's discretion).
4 I.R.S. News Release IR-84-123 (Nov. 30, 1984).
2 See infra notes 279-84 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
27 26 C.F.R. § 601.107 (1977).
* Id.
29 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Reducing the Tax Gap-Results of a GAO-
Sponsored Symposium, 1995 WL 418278 (F.D.C.H) (June 2, 1995).
30 See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d
526 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982).
31 379 U.S. at 57-58.
32 Id. at 55.
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in Powell rejected imposing a probable cause standard for enforcement of
IRS subpoenas, a stance it had adopted with respect to other administrative
agencies.33 The Powell requirements are that the Commissioner of Revenue
"must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate
purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the informa-
tion sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and that
the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed."' These
requirements were intended to protect taxpayers from IRS agents seeking to
use the audit process to gather information about criminal activities of the
taxpayers.35 That an agent might have mixed motives does not prevent the
enforcement of the summons.36 Guilty taxpayers, however, ultimately will
find little protection in the Powell requirements. The mandatory reporting
requirement between the IRS and the DOJ when an IRS tax investigation
reveals indications of criminal activity suggests that the Powell requirements
merely delay the inevitable.
Even evidence with only "potential relevance" to an investigation is
within the scope of the government's demand, and the "applicable standard
is whether the information sought 'might throw light upon the correctness of
the [tax] return."' 37 The Internal Revenue Code requires all individuals lia-
ble for any federal tax to maintain records and make returns in compliance
with the Code. 8 Accordingly, the IRS is entitled to request such records as
part of its investigations.39 One estimate projects that eighty-five percent of
IRS audits result in an assessment of money owed to the government." An
audit commences with an initial notice from an IRS agent specifying the
item(s) that are the subject of the audit and requesting that the taxpayer
schedule an appointment. At this initial meeting, the taxpayer usually will be
requested to show documentation of income and expenses and to respond to
the auditor's questions. The agent will then issue a finding, which a taxpay-
er has thirty days to appeal. If an appeal does not result in an outcome de-
" See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (rejecting imposing a
probable cause standard on the Federal Trade Commission); Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co.
v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
31 Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58.
31 See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
36 Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
3" United States v. Raniere, 895 F. Supp. 699, 703 (D.N.J. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1263 (3d Cir. 1990)).
38 I.R.C. § 6001 (1994). This section provides that "[e]very person liable for any tax
imposed by this title, or for the collection thereof, shall keep such records, render such
statements, make such returns, and comply with such rules and regulations as the Secre-
tary may from time to time prescribe." Id.
39 Id. § 7602.
40 Nancy D. Holt, Solos, High-Income Lawyers Tweak the IRS' Audit Instincts, CHI.
LAW.,Feb. 1992, at 57.
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sirable to the taxpayer, he has ninety days to appeal to the United States
Tax Court.4'
As part of its enforcement of the tax laws, the IRS has broad subpoena
and summons powers.42 The scope of the IRS's powers was described as
"similar to the inquisitorial power of a grand jury."43 The logical focus of
such investigations is on financial documents, including checks and deposit
slips. The Fifth Amendment privilege can be implicated in such investiga-
tions because various financial documents also are admissible in criminal
proceedings." For example, an individual's business records are admissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 806(6). 4s Statements made by authorized
persons could be admissible under Rule 802(d)(2)(c).4 6 Checks, deposit
slips, invoices, and receipts are admissible because they can show conduct
such as making false entries, concealing assets, and other activities sugges-
tive of an intent to mislead or conceal.47 Accordingly, the relationship be-
tween the IRS and agencies that can instigate criminal proceedings is rele-
vant to an analysis of the applicability of the Fifth Amendment in an IRS
investigation.
Investigations by the IRS can result in both civil and criminal penal-
ties.48 In addition to liability for unpaid taxes, punishment for violations of
the Code includes fines and imprisonment.49 IRS agents assist U.S. attor-
neys in the processing of cases, including case preparation and trials."0
B. The Department of Justice Tax Division
The IRS and the DOJ share information. 1 During audits, IRS agents
41 Id.
42 I.R.C. §§ 7602, 7604.
41 United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 537 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1018 (1982); see United States v. Joyce, 498 F.2d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 278-79 (7th Cir. 1973).
" Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
(1968); see 3 CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL, supra note 17, at 60-58.
45 FED. R. EvID. 806(6).
46 3 CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL, supra note 17, at 60-58.
47 Id. at 60-65; see Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943); United States v.
Little, 567 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir. 1977).
48 See I.R.C. § 7203 (1994). One of the seven divisions of the Internal Revenue
Service is the Criminal Investigation Division, which is responsible for detecting and
preventing criminal and civil violations of federal tax laws. INTERNAL REVENUE SER-
VICE, IRS CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION IN ACTION (1992).
41 See generally I.R.C. § 7203 (1994).
' IRS CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION IN ACTION, supra note 48.
s See generally 1 CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL, supra note 17, at 2-3 to 2-32. One
reason for allowing referral between these agencies is the need for speedy resolution of
matters amounting to an "imminent drain on the U.S. Treasury." Id. at 2-21.
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are instructed to look for indications of fraud. 2 If the agents find such in-
dications, they must refer the case to the DOJ' 3 The procedures for this
exchange of information and evidence therefore must be considered in as-
sessing the potential for incrimination. Either the IRS or the Tax Division of
the DOJ can refer matters for prosecution to U.S. attorneys for the purpose
of conducting Title 26 grand jury investigations. 4 The Tax Division also
can participate in joint tax and nontax investigations with the IRS; the Divi-
sion has authority to approve requests seeking to broaden the scope of grand
jury investigations of a nontax matter to include possible federal tax viola-
tions.5 Other ways of instigating criminal investigations include referrals
from other government agencies or from private citizens. 6
Statistics for 1991 indicate that two-thirds of criminal investigations
were recommended for prosecution." Eighty-five percent of those prose-
cuted were convicted, and seventy percent of those convicted received jail
sentences. 8
C. The Government's Use of Tax Returns
Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code addresses permissible uses
of tax returns by the government. Agents may disclose returns to federal
officials for federal criminal investigations and to state officials for tax
crime investigations.5 ' Because disclosures to federal agents are allowed for
both tax and nontax crimes, distinguishing the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment on the basis of whether the individual fears incriminating him-
self for a tax or nontax crime appears arbitrary at best because individuals
potentially receive the same type of punishment-fines or imprison-
ment-for both types of crimes.
D. The Governmental Interest
Before delving too deeply into an analysis of the Ninth Circuit's current
approach, one additional factor must be considered: the governmental inter-
52 1 Internal Revenue Manual: Audit (CCH), at 7247-27 (Apr. 23, 1981) [hereinafter
IRM: Audit].
53 Id. at § 4231, 901.
-4 1 CRIMINAL TAx MANUAL, supra note 17, at 2-10. Matters that the IRS can di-
rectly refer to U.S. attorneys for prosecution include excise taxes, multiple filings of
false and fictitious returns claiming refunds, and trust funds. Id. at 2-21 to 2-22.
5 Id. at 2-10.
56 John Tigue, Jr. & Bryan Skarlatos, Tax Litigation Issues: Federal Prosecutions,
N.Y. LAW J., Mar. 30, 1993, at 3.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 I.R.C. §§ 6103(d), (i) (1994).
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est at stake. One justification for limiting the scope of the privilege is to
promote an "efficient investigation of crime," and particularly of white col-
lar crime.60
The U.S. system of taxation relies on self-reporting taxpayers' honesty
in preparing tax returns.6' The revenue received from taxation is critical to
maintain the government's operations. The gap between taxes paid and those
that would be paid with a one hundred percent compliance rate is estimated
at one hundred billion dollars per year.62 For the government to operate
properly, taxpayers must believe that they are being treated in a fair, even-
handed manner.
Challenges to the tax system's validity are serious affronts. The govern-
ment is intolerant of tax protesters and of the various methods they employ
to avoid, taxes. 63 Refusal to complete tax returns is a commonly used tool
for tax protestors desiring to deceive the IRS.' The Internal Revenue Man-
ual states that such "frivolous 'taxpayer protestor"' claims are not consid-
ered by the IRS to be valid defenses 65 and that such cases should be re-
"o Suzanne Rosenthal Brackley, Now It's Personal: Withdrawing the Fifth
Amendment's Content-Based Protection for All Private Papers in United States v. Doe,
60 BROOK. L. REV. 553, 556 (1994); see Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 100
(1988) (weighing the privilege's negative effect on the government's ability to prosecute
white collar crime).
61 See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
62 ABA Comm. on Taxpayer Compliance, Report and Recommendations on Taxpay-
er Compliance, 41 TAX LAW. 329, 330 (1987).
63 A common tax protestor argument is as follows:
Unless we are granted immunity in exchange for the information, it can be used
by the Justice Department to prosecute us for a nontax crime; it can be presented
to a Grand Jury or used as a lead to obtain evidence which can be presented to a
Grand Jury, to help get us convicted and prosecuted; if we have given false finan-
cial information to any department or agency of state or federal government, the
financial information which we are required to supply on a tax return could tend
to incriminate us of a non-tax crime ....
Urban v. United States, No. 83-C8185, 1984 WL 2806, at *2 (N.D. I11. Apr. 18, 1984).
4 For cases involving tax protestors, see Conklin v. United States, 36 F.3d 1105,
1994 WL 504211, at **1 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 583 (1994) (involving
individual who described himself as akin to "known tax protestor[s], like Jesus Christ,
Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and George Washington"); National Commodity
and Barter Ass'n v. Archer, 31 F.3d 1521, 1525 (10th Cir. 1994) (involving suit
brought by tax protestor organization which "believe[s] in abolition of the Internal Rev-
enue Service," against IRS officials); United States v. Walton, 989 F.2d 497, 1993 WL
78807, at **1 (4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that defendants were "citizens of
the 'foreign state of North Carolina' and, hence, not under the jurisdiction of the United
States"); United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment privilege allowed a sole proprietor to shield his financial records from
compelled disclosure).
65 The Manual lists a variety of such defenses, including
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ferred to the DOJ for enforcement. One policy argument supporting the
IRS's position is that tax protestors should not be encouraged to use such
arguments to circumvent the IRS.66 Some circuits support the IRS's posi-
tion on tax protestors' claims. In United States v. Cheek,6" for example, the
Seventh Circuit upheld jury instructions that a taxpayer's belief in the un-
constitutionality or invalidity of the tax system is not a valid defense.68
Not all courts, however, agree with the IRS's position on this matter.
Given the recognition of instances in which individuals validly can assert
the Fifth Amendment privilege in tax investigations,69 "the IRS is faced
with the unfortunate reality that tax protestors, too, may assert their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions and
requests for documents, and that other methods of obtaining the information
sought may have to be employed."7
This balancing of interests is not unanimously accepted. The dissent in
the U.S. Supreme Court case California v. Byers7 argued that "this balanc-
ing inevitably results in the dilution of constitutional guarantees" and that
that tax laws are unconstitutional because the Sixteenth Amendment was not prop-
erly ratified; . . . that the Federal Reserve System is unconstitutional; therefore,
the Code is unconstitutional to the extent it taxes income represented by notes or
checks which do not contain or are not redeemable in gold or silver; ... that the
requirement of bookkeeping, records maintenance, and employer withholding re-
quirements is in reality "involuntary servitude" and, therefore, are
unconstitutional; ... that refus[ing] to pay income taxes, in whole or in part, on
religious or moral grounds, contending that to do so would violate First Amend-
ment rights; .. .that the graduated income tax scale and the fact that certain de-
ductions or benefits allowed by the Internal Revenue Code are available to some
and not to others deny those latter persons their [Fifth Amendment Due Process]
Constitutional rights; . . . that filing of an income tax return violates the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination; ... that Tax Court is illegally consti-
tuted, and there is a denial of a jury in tax litigation.
1 IRM: Audit, supra note 52, at 7249-21 to 7249-22 (Feb. 23, 1982); see also United
States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976) (rejecting
defendant-appellant's argument that because he had not received certain money lawful-
ly, he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the IRS).'
66 See United States v. Cheek, 931 F.2d 1206, 1208-09 (7th Cir. 1991).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1207 n.1; see also United States v. Dack, 987 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that failure to file a tax return cannot be justified by either the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege or a disagreement with tax laws).
69 See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Garner v. United States,
424 U.S. 648, 650 (1976) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination can under
some circumstances constitute a valid defense for criminal prosecution for failure to file
a tax return); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
7 United States v. Cates, 686 F. Supp. 1185, 1186 (D. Md. 1988).
71 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
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"we should [not] depart in the slightest way from the Bill of Rights."72 The
mere identification of a taxpayer as a tax protestor should not invalidate
automatically his claim against self-incrimination. Partly due to the referral
and reporting process between the IRS and the DOJ, tax protestors legiti-
mately might fear criminal prosecution. This fear of incrimination is concep-
tually the same as that of an individual charged with embezzlement, and this
fear is similar to that of an individual accused of robbery who invokes the
Fifth Amendment privilege.
II. THE TAX-CRIME EXCEPTION TO THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION
In United States v. Troescher,73 the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California reluctantly, enforced an IRS summons against a taxpay-
er for the production of documents.74 The court enforced the summons be-
cause it was bound by precedent but disagreed with the controlling line of
cases.75 According to the court, creating a tax-crime exception to the Fifth
Amendment was unfounded in either public policy or the law.76
A. The Facts of Troescher and the District Court's Findings
On March 9, 1993, the IRS served a summons on Loren Troescher to
appear before an IRS agent, instructing him to bring all his documents and
records that indicated his income for 1986 to 1992, excluding 1991."7
Troescher did not obey this order, and the U.S. District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California granted the government's motion for enforce-
ment." Troescher then appeared before an IRS agent, as ordered, but in-
voked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as grounds
for refusing to answer the agent's questions as well as for his refusal to
Id. at 463 (Black, J., dissenting).
3 No. CV 93-5736 SVW (SHX), 1995 WL 478941 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1995), va-
cated, 99 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 1996). Subsequent to completion of this Note but prior to
publication, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's holding largely
for the reasons articulated in this Note.
Id. at *3 (stating that precedent required enforcement of the subpoena).
75 Id.
76 Id. at *2-*3.
77 Id. at *1. Such subpoenas are referred to as subpoena duces tecum, which de-
scribe in advance the material requested by the grand jury. HARRY I. SUBIN ET AL.,
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE § 12.6(b) (1992). An indi-
vidual complying with such a subpoena accordingly would forfeit the right to resist and
therefore the individual may challenge such a subpoena before appearing by bringing a
motion to quash the subpoena. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
78 See Troescher, 1995 WL 478941, at *1.
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produce any documents." The defendant justified invoking the Fifth
Amendment on the ground that the act of producing the documents would
constitute potentially incriminating testimony."s In an opinion filed on Au-
gust 4, 1994, the district court found Troescher's claim of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege an insufficient defense to the contempt charge against him. In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the proposition from Fisher v.
United States81 that this privilege applies to documents if the act of produc-
ing them would tend to provide a link in the government's chain of evi-
dence. 2
After issuing the opinion in which it held that Troescher had not waived
his Fifth Amendment privilege,83 the district court determined whether
Troescher had a valid Fifth Amendment claim.' The government argued
that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the respondent because his claim
was based on prosecution for a tax crime rather than for a nontax crime.85
The court concluded that under current law in the Ninth Circuit, the
government was "technically correct., 86 In reaching this conclusion, the
court discussed the test used by federal courts to determine whether a
taxpayer's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege can be used to avoid
providing the IRS with tax information. The court explained that to "'claim
the privilege validly a defendant must be faced with substantial hazards of
self-incrimination that are real and appreciable and not merely imaginary
and unsubstantial. Moreover, he must have reasonable cause to apprehend
[such] danger from a direct answer to questions posed to him.' 8 7
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
82 United States v. Troescher, No. CV 93-5736 SVW (SHX), 1994 WL 547514, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1994) (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)).
83 Id.
' United States v. Troescher, No. CV 93-5736 SVW (SHX), 1995 WL 478941
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1995), vacated, 99 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 1996).
81 Id. at *1.
86 Id.
87 Id. at *2 (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 13 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir.
1994) (quoting United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 925 (1981))); see also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951) (hold-
ing that the Fifth Amendment privilege extends to answers that would furnish a link in
the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the defendant); Estate of Fisher v. Commis-
sioner, 905 F.2d 645, 648-49 (2nd Cir. 1990) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege is personal and cannot be asserted by a deceased's estate); Kranz v. Commissioner,
45 T.C.M. (CCH) 409, 410 (1982) (holding that the privilege cannot be invoked "where
the possibility of criminal prosecution is remote or unlikely, and [that] remote or specu-
lative possibilities of prosecution for unspecified crimes are not sufficient."). The U.S.
Tax Court in Kranz further noted that the likelihood of self-incrimination for "a tax or
nontax crime is so remote and so speculative that it cannot support a Fifth Amendment
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The court in Troescher anticipated applying the above test. As the gov-
ernment argued, however, the Ninth Circuit adds an additional step in deter-
mining the validity of a taxpayer's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege to justify withholding financial information and documents from the
IRS.8 The Ninth Circuit first made this distinction in Fuller: "The fifth
amendment's self-incrimination clause provides no right to taxpayers to
refuse to provide the IRS with financial information unless they make some
showing that there is an appreciable possibility of prosecution for a nontax
crime. ,8
9
B. Ninth Circuit Cases Distinguishing Between Tax and Nontax Crimes
In reaching the conclusion that a taxpayer can only assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when genuinely fearing
prosecution for a nontax crime, the court in Fuller cited five cases. 9° At the
time of Fuller, the most recent Supreme Court decisions on the issue were
Fisher v. United States9 and United States v. Doe,9" both of which did
not distinguish between fear of incrimination for tax crimes and for nontax
crimes. In all five of the cases the Ninth Circuit cited, the taxpayers failed
to make the requisite showing of more than a generalized fear of incrimina-
tion. This absence appeared to be the determinative factor in the deci-
sions.93 In United States v. Neff,94 a Ninth Circuit case involving a tax
protestor, the court focused on the fact that the taxpayer used the Fifth
Amendment to protest taxes rather than because of a fear of criminal prose-
cution. In other words, Neff did not fear incrimination but was misusing the
Fifth Amendment as a shield to prevent the government from prosecuting
him for not filing a return. The Ninth Circuit stated that valid claims of the
Fifth Amendment privilege must stem from "something peculiarly incrimi-
nating"" in an individual's circumstances, but it did not rule out the possi-
bility that the "something particularly incriminating" could relate to a tax
claim." Id. at 410.
88 Troescher, 1995 WL.478941, at *2.
89 786 F.2d 1437, 1439 (9th Cir. 1986).
9 Id. at 1439 (citing Hudson v. United States, 766 F.2d 1288, 1291 (9th Cir. 1985);
Boday v. United States, 759 F.2d 1472, 1474 (9th Cir. 1985); McCoy v. Commissioner,
696 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1983); Edwards v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1268, 1270
(9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1238-40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 925 (1980)).
425 U.S. 391 (1975).
9 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
9 See Fuller, 786 F.2d at 1439.
94 615 F.2d 1235.
95 Id. at 1239.
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crime.96
The Court in Fuller also cited its decision in Edwards v. Commission-
er,97 in which it held that valid assertions of the Fifth Amendment privilege
must stem from fear of criminal investigation for specific matters rather than
for a generalized fear of prosecution for tax evasion.98 Nevertheless, indi-
viduals might have real and substantial fears of prosecution for tax evasion
which would reasonably be increased if the IRS begins investigating them.
The taxpayers in Edwards stated that no particularly incriminating activity
and no criminal investigation was pending against them.99 The court in Ed-
wards also did not explicitly distinguish between tax and nontax crimes.
Similarly, in McCoy v. Commissioner,"° the Ninth Circuit did not distin-
guish between tax and nontax crimes."1 This case involved taxpayers re-
fusing to cooperate with an IRS subpoena based on the constitutional
protections of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Thirteenth Amendments."° The
taxpayers refused to explain the basis for their fear of incrimination." 3 The
fourth case cited in Fuller, Boday v. United States,'" similarly contained
no distinction between tax and nontax crimes and involved largely the same
scenario as in McCoy. 5 The appellants' tax returns in Boday contained no
financial information, and the appellants claimed the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege as a blanket protection."°6 The grounds for the court's decision to en-
force the IRS subpoena was that the appellants did not demonstrate more
than a general fear of prosecution. 7
The final case cited in Fuller, Hudson v. United States,' specifically
mentioned fear of incrimination for a nontax crime, but this was raised by
the taxpayer in his claim, not by the court in assessing the claim's validity.
On his tax return, Hudson stated, in response to most of the questions, that
he objected on the grounds that his answers would "'have a tendency to
incriminate me of any ambiguous and false nontax related crime."''
Thus, in creating a tax-crime exception to the use of the Fifth Amend-
96 Id.
680 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1982).
9 Id. at 1270.
9 d.
100 696 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1983).
o McCoy involved taxpayers asserting the privilege but refusing to explain the basis
for their fear of prosecution. Id.
102 Id. at 1236.
103 Id.
104 759 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985).
"' McCoy, 696 F.2d at 1234.
106 Boday, 759 F.2d at 1474.
107 Id. at 1474-75.
109 766 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985).
109 Id. at 1291 (quoting Hudson's tax return).
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ment privilege in tax investigations, the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the five
cases cited in Fuller appears misplaced. The likelihood of having "penalties
affixed to criminal acts," not the fact that the activity was a nontax crime, is
what the courts deemed insufficient to give rise to a Fifth Amendment
claim.
The Ninth Circuit's exception to the use of the privilege appears to be
an anomaly. According to the district court in Troescher, "no other circuit
has distinguished between tax crimes and nontax crimes for Fifth Amend-
ment purposes,... [and] no other treatise has even mentioned these unusual
Ninth Circuit opinions. 11
°
The taxpayer in United States v. Carlson.. asserted the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege in arguing that he could not file a tax return without incrimi-
nating himself for filing false withholding forms."2 The Ninth Circuit de-
nied this claim, stating that to give credence to Carlson's claim "would
license a form of conduct that would undermine the entire system of person-
al income tax collection.""' 3 The court discussed two competing interests
present in tax investigations: the privilege against self-incrimination and the
"need for public revenue collection by a process necessarily reliant on self-
reporting.""' 4  The court recognized that fundamental constitutional
protections, including the privilege against self-incrimination, "may be limit-
ed only for the most substantial of reasons.""' 5 The court stated that in bal-
ancing the two interests involved, "the history and purposes of the privilege,
and the character and urgency of the countervailing public interest" should
be considered."6 The court looked at the base of the taxpayer's claim,
however, and concluded that his invocation of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege was not made in good faith because he had claimed ninety-nine with-
holding exemptions although he was single with no children.'17
Noting that Carlson was using the Fifth Amendment to avoid filing a
return at all is critical. The Fifth Amendment does not protect an individual
from filing a return."' In Carlson, the governmental interest of protecting
"10 No. CV 93-5736 SVW (SHX), 1995 WL 478941, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20,
1995), vacated, 99 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 1996).
H 617 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1980).
i Id. Carlson was a tax protestor who claimed 99 exemptions on his withholding
form. Id. at 520. The court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not protect
disclosure of evidence if the privilege is claimed to protest the tax system rather than to
prevent self-incrimination. Id. at 523.
113 Id. at 520.
114 Id. at 521.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 522 (citing California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 449 (1971) (Harlan, J., con-
curring)).
117 Carlson, 617 F.2d at 524.
118 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
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the tax system was clearly relevant and sharply at stake. In later cases, the
Ninth Circuit has relied on the governmental interests described in
Carlson"9 and has broadened significantly the scope of Carlson's holding.
In Edwards, for example, the court refused to recognize the taxpayer's Fifth
Amendment claim "because the fifth amendment privilege may not itself be
used as a method of evading payment of lawful taxes."' 20 Because a fun-
damental right is at stake, however, this extension of Carlson's holding
merits close scrutiny.
In non-section 7203 investigations, taxpayers usually have filed some
form of a return. To an extent, therefore, these taxpayers already have com-
plied voluntarily. Because this information is not available solely through
the taxpayer's records, abridging the protections of the Fifth Amendment is
not justified in these situations.
In Carlson, the Ninth Circuit balanced the taxpayer's constitutional right
against self-incrimination with the government's reliance on voluntary com-
pliance and self-reporting.'21 The incriminating nature of the disclosures
sought by the government was not determinative of the applicability of the
privilege; instead, the court focused on the government's purpose of collect-
ing money. Furthermore, the government normally has access to a sig-
nificant amount of information. 2 1 The fact that the district court in
Carlson had "failed to explain why the government's need to collect reve-
nue is greater in tax crime situations than in nontax crime situations"'124 is
also bothersome. Because of the various means by which it can obtain infor-
mation about taxes and the financial situation of citizens,"2 the govern-
ment could be said to have less of an interest if a tax crime is involved.
Properly determining whether the privilege against self-incrimination applies
requires balancing the governmental interest in collecting revenue with the
individual's fundamental rights." In cases subsequent to Carlson, the
Ninth Circuit apparently has abandoned this determination.
19 See supra text accompanying note 114.
120 Edwards v. Commissioner, 680 F.2d 1268, 1270 (1982).
2 Carlson, 617 F.2d at 521.
122 Id. at 523-24.
123 See supra notes 10-11.
124 Stanley, supra note 14, at 541.
125 "A taxpayer's employer reports each employee's withholding tax and taxable
income to the IRS. A failure to pay any income tax is obvious from the face of a tax
return when combined with an employer's report indicating that income tax was not
withheld." Id. at 541-42.
126 Id. at 539.
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III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SUPREME COURT'S APPROACHES TO THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Protections against self-incrimination predate the birth of this country.
The protections grew out of opposition to the procedure of English ecclesi-
astical courts whereby an individual, with no pending charge against him,
was forced, usually by torture, to respond to broad questions and to incrimi-
nate himself.27 In Colonial America, writs of assistance were issued to
revenue officers that gave them nearly unlimited discretion to search sus-
pected places for smuggled goods and that placed the "liberty of every man
in the hands of every petty officer."' 28 Resentment of such government ac-
tions led the Founding Fathers to create the Fifth Amendment protec-
tion."'
Prior to the enactment of the United States Constitution, this common
law privilege was sufficiently broad to encompass the production of per-
sonal documents that might be incriminating. 3 ' The Fifth Amendment
codified the privilege against self-incrimination.' The power of courts to
require citizens to produce documents originally paralleled the power of the
Court of Chancery in Great Britain:
[O]ne cardinal rule of the court of chancery is never to de-
cree a discovery which might tend to convict the party of a
crime, or to forfeit his property. And any compulsory discov-
ery by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the produc-
tion of his private books and papers, to convict him of a
crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles
of a free government.'32
127 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 29-36 (1968); see
David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1079 (1986).
128 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 142 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds.,
1965).
129 See United States v. Carlson, 617 F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir. 1980); Levy, supra note
127, at 405-32.
130 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 418 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(describing the original protection as a "right of silence" meaning that the "legal process
could not force incriminating statements from the defendant's own lips").
131 The Fifth Amendment was intended to serve as a restraint against governments'
tendency to interfere with its citizens private lives. See Brackley, supra note 60, at 553.
132 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886). The Court further noted that
"[i]t is abhorrent to the instincts of a Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an
American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power, but it cannot abide the pure
atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom." Id. at 632.
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This original broad protection has been narrowed severely.133
The privilege was created by the Founding Fathers in recognition of the
tendency of government, left unchecked, to disregard individual autono-
my."' The protection addresses several main policies.135 One commenta-
tor explained these policies by placing them in the following categories:
the "foxhunter" policies of discouraging torture and brow-
beating and maintaining a fair state-individual balance of ad-
vantages in criminal proceedings, the "old woman's" policy
of avoiding the cruel "trilemma" of self-accusation, perjury,
or contempt, and the "hermit's" policy of preserving a pri-
vate enclave where one may lead a private life.'36
Professor Wigmore defined the terms of the privilege as an effort to "com-
ply with the prevailing ethic that the individual is sovereign and that the
proper rules of battle between government and individual require that the
individual not be bothered for less than good reason and not be conscripted
by his opponent to defeat himself."'37
A. The History of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination
The analysis used by the Supreme Court to determine the validity of
Fifth Amendment claims has changed with time. A property-rights approach
prevailed until midway through this century."' Under this approach, the
private property of an individual was simply beyond the scope of the
government's subpoena power.'39 The next type of analysis employed by
the Supreme Court was a privacy approach, which was concerned with pro-
tecting an individual's expectations of privacy.14 The Supreme Court then
133 See infra notes 138-220 and accompanying text.
134 See Brackley, supra note 60, at 554.
135 See generally Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (holding that
the privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination
under federal as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state
as well as federal law).
136 Robert Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents-Cutting Fisher's
Tangled Line, 49 MO. L. REv. 439 (1984).
137 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 318 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
138 See Heidt, supra note 136, at 450-59.
139 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
141 See generally Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) (holding that the
privilege against self-incrimination "is an intimate and personal one. It respects a pri-
vate inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state intrusion to
extract self-condemnation").
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adopted the implied-admissions test, through which the question of whether
the act of producing evidence in compliance with a subpoena would consti-
tute incriminating testimony became the determinative factor of the validity
of a Fifth Amendment claim.
141
The following discussion of these different approaches attempts to ex-
plain the extent of protection provided by the Fifth Amendment and to ana-
lyze whether the Ninth Circuit's approach is consistent or justifiable in light
of these approaches.
1. The Property-Rights Approach
The property-rights approach to the Fifth Amendment privilege was set
out in Boyd v. United States. 2 In this case, the Supreme Court first ac-
cepted application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to documents.'43 At
the center of the case was a statute which compelled the production of busi-
ness records.'" The defendants in Boyd were accused of failing to pay tax-
es on imported glass.145 The government, in requesting judicial enforce-
ment of the order for production of the glass invoice, argued that forcing the
invoice's production did not differ from seizing stolen goods.'46 The court
rejected the government's argument:
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or
goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid payment there-
of, are totally different things from a search for and seizure
of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of ob-
taining information therein contained, or of using them as
evidence against him .... In the one case, the government
is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is
not. 
147
In reaching its conclusions, the Court discussed at length Lord Camden's
141 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
142 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
143 Interestingly, the Court in Boyd viewed the sole proprietor's business papers as
personal papers. Id. at 622-23, 637.
14 Id. at 632. Under the statute, if a government attorney believes that "any business
book, invoice, or paper belonging to, or under the control of, the defendant or claimant,
will tend to prove any allegation made by the United States," the attorney may seek a
subpoena by submitting "a written motion ... setting forth the allegation which he
expects to prove." Id. at 619-20.
145 Id. at 618.
146 Id. at 622.
147 Id. at 623.
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opinion in the English case of Entick v. Carrington.4  According to the
philosophy underlying that opinion, protection of property is the very reason
that men enter into society.' Individuals' exclusive rights to their own
property are "preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances where it
has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the
whole.""15 Accordingly, property interests are tantamount to all others. The
Court in Boyd embraced the idea expressed by Lord Camden that a subpoe-
na for an individual's personal documents equals a trespass.
151
The test originating in Boyd was a simple one: if an individual owned
the document, he could resist the subpoena.' This approach resulted in
difficulties for the Court, for proving crimes became considerably more
difficult when an individual could conceal relevant evidence merely because
he owned it.'53 An individual's private books can reveal criminal liabili-
ty, 154 in the case of Boyd for duties,'55 but can also be suppressed to con-
ceal and avoid such liability.'56 One writer, describing the scope of the
Fifth Amendment in light of Boyd, stated that "[tihe Court soon found,
however, that its broad interpretation of the privilege made grand jury inves-
tigations nearly impossible. This result was devastating ... to [various]...
forms of regulation and to criminal investigation in general."'57 This unsat-
isfactory situation contributed to the Supreme Court's movement away from
the property-rights approach.'58
The Court's transition to a privacy-rights approach is illustrated by the
"required records" rule.'59 Under this rule, certain documents required by
Id. at 626-30 (quoting Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765)).
149 Id. at 627.
150 Id.,
"' Id. "By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so
minute, is a trespass." Id. (quoting Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817).
152 See id.
153 See Heidt, supra note 136, at 449.
154 One commentator discussed the ability of a sole proprietor to resist a subpoena:
"[A] grand jury investigating price-fixing will routinely subpoena documents from sev-
eral suspected competitors. All but the sole proprietorship must comply. This ability to
suppress documents, which often supply crucial evidence in a price-fixing prosecution,
may in practice virtually eliminate the sole proprietorship's antitrust exposure." Heidt,
supra note 136, at 442.
155 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618.
156 Id.
157 R. Erik Lillquist, Note, Constitutional Rights at the Junction: The Emergence of
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Interstate Commerce Act, 81 VA. L.
REV. 1989, 1991 (1995).
15 See Heidt, supra note 136, at 449-50. Accordingly, during the past century, the
scope of the Fifth Amendment has been limited, so that fewer documents are protected.
Id. at 450-72.
159 This discussion of the required records doctrine is included to illustrate the change
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the government to be maintained for regulatory purposes are considered
public records."6° As such, the government can compel their production,
and the Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be validly asserted.' This rule
applies even if the records are owned by the individual claiming the privi-
lege. 162 Because required records are kept for government purposes and
"promote a legitimate regulatory aim,' 63 the government has the owner-
ship interest in the documents."6 The required records rule is not inher-
ently inconsistent with the property-rights approach, as the rule merely ques-
tions who has the ownership interest in the documents. 165 The Court's
adoption of this rule demonstrated a growing willingness to enforce govern-
ment demands for certain documents.
in the Court's philosophy, not for purposes of analyzing the Fifth Amendment
privilege's applicability in tax investigations. Although section 6103 of the Internal
Revenue Code requires individuals to keep certain records and forbids the IRS from
sharing these with other agencies, the IRS has not used this doctrine to support motions
for enforcement of subpoenas. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Collins, 997
F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1993) ("required-records doctrine is inapplicable to a
case ... in which the individual is not required to maintain a record but does so as a
matter of convenience"); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to B.M., 335 N.W.2d
420 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that because a copy of a tax return is not a return,
section 6103 does not protect a taxpayer from responding to a subpoena for a tax re-
turn, but that act of production is protected by the Fifth Amendment because production
would both admit the copies' existence and authenticate them); DEPARTMENT OF JUS-
TICE TAX DIVISION, MANUAL FOR CRIMINAL TAX TRIALS 103 (1973). But see cases
interpreting tax returns as required records: Lowder v. All Star Mills, 273 S.E.2d 247,
264 (N.C. 1981); In re Grand Jury Empaneled Mar. 19, 1980, 541 F.Supp. 1 (D.N.J.
1981), affid, 680 F.2d 327 (3rd Cir. 1982).
" Public records include "records required by law to be kept in order that there may
be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmen-
tal regulation, and the enforcement of restrictions validly established." Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911).
161 See id.; see also Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that peti-
tioner could not invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid disclosing documents
he was required to keep under the Emergency Price Control Act).
162 Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 16-20.
163 Craib v. Bulmash, 777 P.2d 1120, 1122, 1126 (Cal. 1989) (applying the doctrine
because the reporting requirement demanded "minimal disclosure of information of a
kind customarily kept in the ordinary course of business" and because the type of re-
cords involved tended to have a "'diminished expectation of privacy"').
64 Id. The Court in Shapiro stated that this principle applies "'to records required by
law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information of transactions which are
the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions
validly established."' Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 17 (emphasis omitted).
165 The Court in Wilson explained, "[T]he physical custody of incriminating docu-
ments does not of itself protect the custodian against their compulsory production. The
question still remains with respect to the nature of the documents and the capacity in
which they are held." Wilson, 221 U.S. at 380.
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The applicability of the Fifth Amendment to corporate documents close-
ly parallels the required records doctrine. In Hale v. Henkel,'66 the Court
justified enforcement of government summons of corporate documents on
the grounds that corporations are state-created entities and as such the state
retains visitorial powers over certain aspects of them.167 The distinction be-
tween corporate and personal documents then became privacy, and the pri-
vacy expectations associated with corporate documents were not treated the
same as the privacy interest in personal papers.16 This approach is long-
standing, although private interest in personal papers is not currently rele-
vant in the use of the Fifth Amendment. 169
2. The Privacy-Rights Approach
The privacy-rights approach to the privilege against self-incrimination
was based on the belief that the contents of one's private papers and docu-
ments are so personal in nature that permitting the government to "forcibly
gain access to [them] would violate a fundamental purpose of the Constitu-
tion: to protect the individual from the abuse of power by the State."'
This approach is consistent with that of Boyd; in that case, the Court consid-
ered government-forced production of private papers to be an impermissible
invasion of personal security, liberty, and property.' 7' One commentator
described such documents as "an extension of the individual's mind" and
characterized a forced taking of such writings as "psychologically compa-
rable to prying words from his lips."'7
The idea that one's writings embody one's self supports the argument
that compelling submission of such writings constitutes compelling testimo-
ny against one's self. Justice Brennan described the similarities between
forcing oral testimony and acquiring testimony through the contents of doc-
uments:
166 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
167 Id. at 74-75.
168 Id.
169 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). The Court in Doe also showed this
willingness by the manner in which it chose to classify the documents at issue. The
subject of the subpoena was a large number of records from several businesses of the
sole proprietor. Id. at 606-07. The Third Circuit had analogized these records to an
individual's personal papers, but the Court rejected that characterization in favor of
classifying them as business records. Id.
170 Brackley, supra note 60, at 554; see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976);
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627-
30 (1886).
171 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
172 Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48
U. PITT. L. REV. 27, 39 (1986).
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[N]o principle which does not permit compelling one to
disclose the contents of one's mind but does permit compel-
ling the disclosure of the contents of that scrap of paper by
compelling its production . . . The ability to think private
thoughts, facilitated as it is by pen and paper, and the ability
to preserve intimate memories would be curtailed through
fear that those thoughts or the events of those memories
would become the subjects of criminal sanctions however
invalidly imposed."'
The Court's most direct endorsement of the privacy approach was in
Couch v. United States.17 4 In that case, the Fifth Amendment was found
inapplicable to protect an individual's documents that were in the possession
of his accountant.'75 The rationale for this ruling was that because an ac-
countant was inspecting documents for the purpose of required disclosures
in compliance with the tax laws, the privacy expectation of the individual
was diminished.'76 The Court in Couch made several references to Boyd
but interpreted that case differently than it previously had.'77 The Court
viewed the contents of the documents themselves, rather than who had the
ownership interest, as determinative of the applicability of the Fifth Amend-
ment.'78
In Bellis v. United States, 9 the Court elaborated on its statement from
Couch that "the ingredient of personal compulsion... is lacking" regarding
documents held by an accountant.8 ' The petitioner in Bellis was a corpo-
rate officer who, in a representational capacity, held documents that had the
potential to incriminate him personally. 8' The Court ruled that because a
privacy expectation is absent in documents held in a representational capaci-
ty, the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply to the petitioner, and it
could not be used to prevent the government from obtaining the docu-
173 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 420 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has not
adopted the above reasoning and does not currently consider whether a document has a
legitimate expectation of privacy surrounding it in determining whether government
compelled production is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. Heidt, supra note 136, at
450-68.
'- 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 335.
' See Heidt, supra note 136, at 457-58.
178 Couch, 409 U.S. at 329-35; see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 619-39
(1886); Heidt, supra note 136, at 457-58.
179 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
'8 Couch, 409 U.S. at 329.
181 Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88.
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ments.'82
3. The Implied-Admissions Approach
The privacy-rights approach soon was narrowed into the implied-admis-
sions test set out in United States v. Fisher."3 The Court noted that pro-
tecting privacy for privacy's sake was not the goal of the Fifth Amend-
ment.'84 The Court held that private statements are admissible even if they
incriminate, as long as they were not compelled when originally made. 5
All invasions of privacy do not implicate the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. In order for a document to be protected from governmental compul-
sion, the act of producing the document must be incriminating.'86 The
Court stated that constitutional protection of personal privacy was covered
by, and limited in its scope to, the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth. 7
The Framers ... struck a balance so that when the State's
reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found be-
comes sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy becomes
justified and a warrant to search and seize will issue. They
did not seek in still another Amendment-the Fifth-to
achieve a general protection of privacy but to deal with the
more specific issue of compelled self-incrimination.'
In Fisher, the Court recognized that the act of producing evidence has
"communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the
papers produced."'8 9 The question then became whether the resulting com-
182 Id.
183 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The documents at issue in Fisher were an accountant's
workpapers analyzing a taxpayer's checks and deposit slips for a determination of in-
come. Id. at 393-94.
184 Id. at 400.
The proposition that the Fifth Amendment protects private information obtained
without compelling self-incriminating testimony is contrary to the clear statements
of this Court that under appropriate safeguards private incriminating statements of
an accused may be overheard and used in evidence, if they are not compelled at
the time they are uttered.
Id. This philosophy clearly underlies the Court's approach to voluntarily created docu-
ments, including diaries. See infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text. Justice
Brennan, among others, has objected to such an approach. See infra notes 204-10 and
accompanying text.
185 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 400.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 400-01.
188 Id. at 400.
189 Id. at 410. The Court held that documents prepared by an accountant were not a
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munication was both testimonial and incriminating.9 ° If the act of produc-
tion supplied only a minimal amount of evidence to the government's case
then the communication was deemed not to be testimonial.' 9' In order for
evidence to be testimonial, it must "reveal the contents of one's mind."'92
One test used by courts to determine whether the Fifth Amendment
privilege should apply in a particular case is whether the production of the
subpoena's requested subject matter would establish a link in the chain of
the investigation that could create criminal liability.'93 The privilege may
be asserted as to facially innocuous questions if an individual, by answering
the question, might provide information that could be used to prosecute that
individual.'94 In the context of IRS subpoenas, the inquiry is whether the
taxpayer reasonably fears that providing information about his income or
financial assets could "establish criminal failure to file."
195
The communicative aspects of responding to a subpoena for documents
include verifying both the existence of the documents and the taxpayer's
possession of them as well as demonstrating the taxpayer's belief that the
documents are those requested in the subpoena.'96 The existence of these
communicative aspects is insufficient to allow an individual to resist a sub-
poena absent such a verification constituting testimonial and incriminating
evidence. 97 The Court in Fisher applied this rule to the facts of the case
and concluded that because the existence of the documents at is-
testimonial communication by the taxpayer and that their production was not compelled
because their preparation was voluntary. Id.
"9 Id. "[T]he Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled pro-
duction of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is
compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating." Id. at 408.
191 Id.
192 Nancy J. King, Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege for Producing Corporate Docu-
ments, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1544, 1550 (1986) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966) (holding that evidence of analysis of blood taken from the defendant after
his arrest for driving while intoxicated did not violate his Fifth Amendment privilege)).
,' See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);
Hoffman v. United States 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
'9 United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438 (3rd Cir. 1952); see Senate Select Comm.
on Secret Military Assistance v. Secord, 664 F. Supp. 562 (D.D.C. 1987). In Coffey, the
Third Circuit stated the requirement:
It is enough (1) that the trial court be shown by argument how conceivably a
prosecutor, building on the seemingly harmless answer, might proceed step by
step to link the witness with some crime against the United States, and (2) that
this suggested course and scheme of linkage not seem incredible in the circum-
stances of the particular case.
Coffey, 198 F.2d at 440.
195 United States v. Bodwell, 66 F.3d 1000, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995).
19 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
197 Id.
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sue-accountant's workpapers--could be assumed because they were used
by the accountant to compute the client's taxes, admitting the papers' exis-
tence would provide little additional evidence to the government. 9
Fisher substantially deviated from the spirit, if not the actual language,
of Boyd. The Court in Boyd held that "compulsory ... production of
his ... private books and papers" compels an individual to be a witness
against himself within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.'99 The Court
in Fisher stated that many of Boyd's assertions have not "stood the test of
time."2" The Court recognized dicta from prior cases that referred to the
notion that individuals cannot be required to produce private documents."0'
The Court went on to indicate, however, that the prior cases relied too
heavily upon the intimate relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments and to suggest that government-compelled production of private pa-
pers violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore automatically violated the
Fifth Amendment.2 2 The Court stated that
the foundations for the rule have been washed away .... In
consequence, the prohibition against forcing the production
of private papers has long been a rule searching for a ratio-
nale consistent with the proscriptions of the Fifth Amend-
ment against compelling a person to give "testimony" that
incriminates him.203
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Fisher cautioned against the majority's
approach that production of voluntarily created documents cannot be consid-
ered compelled for purposes of asserting the Fifth Amendment.' Justice
Brennan argued that the creation of documents does not determine the in-
criminatory effects on an individual. One commentator stated that "one
might justifiably question, as Justice Brennan would, what the creation of a
document (unless the creation was forced) has to do with whether or not the
document's creator is being compelled to reveal its contents."'
In Fisher, Brennan enumerated several specific objections to the
198 Id. at 411.
'99 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1886).
20' Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407.
201 Id. at 400-01 (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911)).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 409.
204 Id. at 414-30 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 427-28 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Brackley, supra note 60, at 559 n.25.
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majority's opinion."7 First, he stated that because the Fifth Amendment
protects against the compelled disclosure of the contents of one's mind,
documents that act as an "extension of his person" should also be privileged
from government compulsion.2 8 Second, the majority's opinion could be
interpreted as suggesting that a subpoena of an individual's diary containing
confessions to a crime might not be protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination.2 9 Brennan's primary objection to the majority's reasoning
was that it suggested that "protection of personal privacy is merely a by-
product and not,, as our precedents and history teach, a factor controlling...
the scope of the privilege."21
Justice Marshall had similar difficulties with the majority's opinion. He
cited a line of precedents protecting private papers211 and stated that "they
represent a deeply held belief on the part of the Members of this Court
throughout its history that there are certain documents no person ought to be
compelled to produce at the Government's request., 212
In United States v. Doe,21 3 the Court extended the implied-admissions
doctrine. 24 Doe involved subpoenas for a sole proprietor's business re-
cords during an investigation of municipal corruption.25 The Court con-
cluded that the privilege against self-incrimination did not extend to vol-
untarily prepared business records because the act of producing such records
would not entail testimonial self-incrimination but merely required the tax-
payer to verify the existence, possession, and accuracy of the records.216
The contents of the documents were deemed irrelevant in determining
whether the act of production was incriminatory.2 7
Justice O'Connor authored a concurrence in Doe and summarized the
effect of the majority's opinion: "the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely
no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind."2 In Balti-
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414.
208 Id. at 420 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 415 (Brennan, J., concurring).
210 Id. at 416 (Brennan, J., concurring).
211 See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322 (1973); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
212 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 431-32 (Marshall, J., concurring).
213 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
214 The I.R.S. Manual explains this rule by stating that "a summons only compels a
witness to produce; and unless he has been compelled to write the document, there is
no element of compulsion as to the documents themselves." 2 IRM: Admin., supra note
1, at 8002 (Jan. 14, 1987).
215 Doe, 465 U.S. at 606.
216 Id. at 612-13.
217 d.; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Subpoenas for Documents, 41 F.3d
377, 380 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that production of taxpayer's financial documents and
personal papers would "implicitly vouch for the[ir] genuineness").
218 Doe, 465 U.S. at 418 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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more Department of Social Services v. Bouknight,219 the Court again re-
jected a content-based approach and refused to allow the Fifth Amendment
to protect a mother from compliance with a court order to produce her in-
fant son.22°
B. An Analysis of the Current State of Fifth Amendment Law
One commentator has suggested that "the act of production analysis...
serves to protect truly intimate and personal documents without providing a
haven of protection for incriminating documents in which a privacy interest
is lacking."22' The accuracy of this statement, however, is questionable.
For example, as part of its investigation into charges brought against Senator
Robert Packwood, the Senate Select Committee oIl Ethics subpoenaed his
diary.222 The Senator was forced to turn over his entire diary, in which he
clearly had a large privacy interest.223 Senator Packwood's production of
his diary was deemed non-incriminating because he had already attested to
its existence and relevancy.2"
The increased willingness of courts to enforce subpoenas of diaries and
planners evinces an overall trend of courts to find individual's constitutional
objections illegitimate.2" Moreover, this area is reflective of the larger de-
bate underlying courts' application of the Fifth Amendment: whether
individual's privacy expectations are, or should be, protected by the Fifth
Amendment.226 "Prying open a personal diary and forcing its writer to re-
219 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
2 Id. at 555.
221 Daniel E. Will, Note, "Dear Diary-Can You Be Used Against Me?": The Fifth
Amendment and Diaries, 35 B.C. L. REV. 965, 969 (1994).
222 Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319, 1319 (1994).
In 1992, the Senate Select Committee on Ethics began an investigation of Senator
Bob Packwood's alleged sexual misconduct, intimidation of victims and misuse of
staff in efforts to intimidate and discredit the alleged victims. The Ethics Commit-
tee investigation ultimately included a subpoena for over eight thousand pages of
a personal diary Senator Packwood maintained since 1969.
Will, supra note 221, at 965.
223 Will, supra note 221, at 965.
2N Id.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1091 (1994). One writer expressed concern engendered by this trend: "In a society that
so values individual privacy and expression, it is vital that people not be reluctant to
think through their pens, and not have to risk an invasion of their private thoughts
merely because the fallibility of memory necessitates that they write things down."
Brackley, supra note 60, at 584-85.
226 For articles discussing this issue at greater length, see Brackley, supra note 60;
Heidt, supra note 136. Brackley summed up the two sides of the issue:
[T]he Fisher Court apparently was struggling to merge the "naturalistic view" of
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veal her innermost thoughts, however incriminating they may be, would no
doubt have been as reprehensible to our forefathers as prying open a
person's lips to extract a confession.""22 Financial documents, although
clearly different in nature from diaries, also can reveal private information
about individuals, such as details about lifestyle.
In United States v. Doe (Doe /),228 as part of an investigation into vio-
lations of securities laws, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
subpoenaed several documents, including the defendant's daily planner.229
He used the planner to record both business and personal information23°
and previously had testified that he used and possessed it."3 Declining to
use a content-based approach to the applicability of the privilege against
self-incrimination, the Second Circuit ruled that Doe's compliance with .the
subpoena would not equal testimony.23 2 A commentator explained the
court's holding: "Adopting a strict constructionist reading, the Second Cir-
cuit insisted that because the word 'privacy' is not written explicitly in the
text of the Fifth Amendment, there is no reason to suggest that any privacy
interest underlies the Amendment." '233 The Second Circuit's approach was
inapposite to that of Justice Brennan, who noted that "[e]xpressions are
legion in opinions of this Court that the protection of personal privacy is a
central purpose of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. '
The dissent in Doe II lambasted the majority's holding, specifically on the
distinction between personal and business documents."l Circuit Judge
Altimari stated that the majority had recognized that the planner was a per-
sonal paper and concluded that "[t]o hold that a person must divulge self-
the Boyd Court-that privacy is one of the "inalienable rights which antedated the
creation of the state and which were absolutely beyond its control"-with the
modern "legal realist" view-that all "individual claims to right are relative to
other societal interests."
Brackley, supra note 60, at 571 (footnotes omitted).
2 Doe, 1 F.3d at 96 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
2a Id.
229 Id. at 88.
230 Id. Doe used the planner to "record appointments, social engagements, chores,
phone numbers, and other reminders." Id.
231 Id. at 93.
232 Id. at 92-94.
3 Brackley, supra note 60, at 572-73 (footnote omitted).
14 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 416 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); see
also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment allows a citizen "to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment"). One commentator has argued against this
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment: "An extension to personal documents of the
penumbral right of privacy emanating from the Fifth and other amendments is inappro-
priate in both practice and policy." Will, supra note 221, at 969.
" Doe, 1 F.3d at 95 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
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incriminating statements merely because she chose to write them down rath-
er than keep them sealed in her head, is to strip the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege of its intended power."236 The previous discussion of pre-Colonial
American origins of the Fifth Amendment, moreover, suggests that privacy
concerns clearly underlay the creation of the protection.237
In Doe II, the Second Circuit held that the Fifth Amendment is as inap-
plicable to the contents of private papers as it is to business documents.23
Several circuit courts follow this approach.239 Other circuits leave some
hope for the Fifth Amendment protection for private documents."0 Never-
theless, these latter cases do not offer much solace when it is considered
that
[i]n this day of multidistrict investigations, it is precipitate to
throw in the towel and voluntarily produce documents during
an administrative investigation (or civil litigation) conducted
in one venue, when a related criminal investigation may be
conducted simultaneously, or subsequently, in another circuit
which might be more receptive to claims of Fifth Amend-
ment protection for subpoenaed private papers.2'
Currently, the Fifth Amendment only shields an individual from produc-
ing certain documentary evidence if there is an element of personal com-
pulsion present in obtaining a testimonial communication from the ac-
cused. 2 Accordingly, because individuals keep both business and personal
records by choice and not by government compulsion, the Fifth Amendment
offers no protection for these records. Compulsion enters the picture if the
236 Id. at 96.
z See supra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
2 Doe, 1 F.3d at 92-93.
2 See, e.g., United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981, 983-84 (4th Cir. 1991), aff'd
after remand sub. nom. United States v. Stone, 976 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 507 U.S. 1029 (1993); In re Sealed Case, 837 F.2d 83, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th
Cir. 1985).
24 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 921 F.2d 1184, 1187 n.6 (11th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Mason, 869 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Steinberg, 837 F.2d
527, 530 (1st Cir. 1988); Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1985) (allow-
ing that private papers might be protected where forcing their production would "break
'the heart of our sense of privacy"') (citations omitted); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
632 F.2d 1033, 1042 (3rd Cir. 1980).
"' Joel Cohen, Are John Doe's Personal Papers Protected by the Fifth Amendment
Anymore? N.Y. L.J., Sept. 21, 1993, at 1.
2 See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).
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act of producing the copies verifies and authenticates their existence."
The act of producing evidence pursuant to a subpoena may have the requi-
site aspects of compulsion because compliance would prove both the exis-
tence of the papers and the individual's possession of them.2'
Disclosures in tax returns and in financial documents can reveal a signif-
icant amount of private information about an individual, some of which may
be incriminating.1 5 By answering the first several questions on his tax re-
turn, the taxpayer has identified his name, address, social security number,
and number of children or other dependents; the next entries expose annual
gross income." Additionally, whereas Form W-2 provides vital facts
about employment, Schedule A potentially can include information concern-
ing the taxpayer's religious beliefs, source of borrowed money, union mem-
bership, medical condition of his family, political inclinations, and other per-
sonal facts. " Logically, private records would be afforded a greater de-
gree of protection than would tax returns. As such, because tax returns
themselves are offered a high, degree a privacy,2" taxpayers reasonably
could presume that their personal documents would have even greater
protections.
The close relationship between the IRS and the DOJ in tax investiga-
tions increases the chance of an individual incriminating himself. In numer-
ous cases, the IRS has attempted to support enforcement of subpoenas on
the grounds that the DOJ currently is not contemplating prosecution of the
matter.2" The IRS bases this argument on the requirements of section
7602(c) of the Internal Revenue Code which states that summonses cannot
be issued if a DOJ referral is in effect.' 0 This argument is not convincing,
23 Cohen, supra note 241, at 1.
14 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
2" See Stanley, supra note 14, at 547-55. In Garner v. United States, on his tax re-
turn, the defendant listed his occupation as "professional gambler." 424 U.S. 648, 649-
50 (1976). This disclosure was introduced in a nontax criminal trial to demonstrate his
familiarity with gambling. Id. at 650. The Court did not permit Garner to claim the
Fifth Amendment privilege during his trial because he simply could have claimed the
Fifth Amendment on his tax return in response to questions regarding occupation. Id. at
656. The Court reasoned that the government had not compelled Garner to incriminate
himself. Id. at 656-65.
24 See William A. Edmundson, Note, Discovery of Federal Income Tax Returns and
the New "Qualified" Privileges, 1984 DUKE L.J. 938, 939 n.2.
247 Id.
28 Government agencies, for example, are generally prohibited from access to IRS
tax returns. I.R.C. § 6103 (1994). See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Collins, 997 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[i]ncome tax returns are
highly sensitive documents").
49 See, e.g., Estate of Fisher v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 645, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Berry, 807 F. Supp. 439 (W.D. Tenn. 1992).
250 I.R.C. § 7602(c) (1994).
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however, in light of the requirement that IRS agents refer matters to the
DOJ upon a finding of evidence of fraud. 5' In United States v. Sharp,2
the Fourth Circuit found that despite statements by the IRS of no current
intention to prosecute a taxpayer, the privilege against self-incrimination
applied in an investigation of civil tax liability 53
Estate of Fisher v. Commissioner 4 involves a motion filed in the U.S.
Tax Court by the Commissioner of the IRS to require Fisher to respond to
various discovery requests.5 Attached to the motion was an affidavit
claiming that Fisher was not the subject of a current IRS criminal investiga-
tion. 56 The Tax Court subsequently ruled against Fisher's estate on the
grounds that Fisher could not assert validly the Fifth Amendment privilege
because he did not have "reasonable cause to apprehend danger of a crimi-
nal prosecution. '"" The basis for the Tax Court's reasoning was the IRS's
repeated assertions that Fisher was not subject to a criminal investiga-
tion. 58 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit concluded that
"[r]eliance on statements made by the IRS's Criminal Investigation Division
as to its current enforcement policies respecting taxpayer are mis-
placed." 9 In reaching this conclusion, the court followed its prior decision
in United States v. Edgerton.26 ° In Edgerton, the court rejected the reliance
approach which focused on the government's intention to prosecute and
instead adopted an approach that considered only the possible incrimination
faced by a witness in answering the question. 6 The Supreme Court in
251 See Berry, 807 F. Supp. 441-42; infra notes 254-63 and accompanying text.
252 920 F.2d 1167, 1170 (4th Cir. 1990).
" Id.; see Compelled Production, supra note 6, at A-32 (Oct. 14, 1996). In Mathis
v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court found the petitioner guilty on the basis of
information contained in oral testimony and documents acquired from the petitioner
while in prison for unrelated crimes. The government argued that the information was
obtained from questions asked as part of a routine tax investigation, in which no crimi-
nal charges had been brought. Id. at 4. The Court, in rejecting this argument, recognized
that tax investigations often result in criminal prosecution. Id.; see also United States v.
Harper, 397 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (upholding invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege to resist subpoena for information about assets and sources of income
out of fear of incrimination for failure to file or pay taxes despite improbability of
prosecution).
254 905 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1990).
'5' Id. at 648.
256 Id.
" Id. Fisher died while the case was pending, and the trial court granted a motion to
substitute Fisher's estate for the decedent. Id.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 649.
26 734 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1984).
261 Id. at 921. In Edgerton, the court held that a witness is not required to exceed the
minimal level showing of potential incrimination or establish that the government does
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United States v. Wilson 2 used a similar analysis: "It is the incriminating
tendency of the disclosure, and not the pendency of the prosecution against
the witness, upon which the right depends.
263
Other courts, however, have considered an IRS referral to the DOJ as
creating such a significantly high potential for criminal prosecution that
invocation of the privilege is justified.' The Seventh Circuit, for instance,
has held that unless a formal referral was made from the IRS to the DOJ at
the time of a court hearing for the enforcement of the summons, in order to
resist the enforcement, the burden is on the taxpayer to show that no legiti-
mate civil purpose will be served by enforcement of the summons."6 This
view directly conflicts with the Second Circuit, which has stated that
"[r]eliance on statements made by the IRS's Criminal Investigation Division
as to its current enforcement policies respecting taxpayer are misplaced...
[and instead the focus should be on] whether answering the question would
tend to incriminate the witness.""
In performing the implied-admissions test" when assessing the appli-
cability of a Fifth Amendment privilege to a particular taxpayer, a court
should assess the admissibility at a criminal trial of a disclosure made by
the taxpayer. Using a Federal Rule of Evidence 402 analysis, the fact that an
individual received income from an unknown source and for an unknown
amount increases the likelihood that the individual is engaged in illegal
activity." Moreover, the implied-admissions test weighs against basing
the determination of a taxpayer's claim of Fifth Amendment protection on
the government's intention to prosecute. 269 In determining whether the evi-
dence would provide a link in the chain of the government's case, the im-
plied-admissions test avoids the issue of whether the government will in fact
prosecute the taxpayer.
In United States v. Cates, 27 the District Court of Maryland recognized
in fact intend to prosecute him in order to validly assert the privilege. Id. at 921. See
also United States v. Jones, 703 F.2d 473, 477-78 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958).
262 221 U.S. 361, 379 (1911) (citation omitted).
263 Id.; see also Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472
(1972); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); United States v. O'Henry's
Film Works, 598 F.2d 313, 317 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Even a routine tax investigation is a
situation in which answers to questions by an IRS agent might tend to incriminate, and
thus Fifth Amendment rights apply to such answers.").
26 See, e.g., United States v. Carr, 585 F. Supp. 863, 866 (E.D. La. 1984).
26 United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 541 (7th Cir. 1981).
266 Estate of Fisher v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 645, 649 (2d Cir. 1990).
267 See supra notes 251-63 and accompanying text.
26 See FED. R. EvID. 402.
269 See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
270 686 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Md. 1988).
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that the contents of documents were not protected by the Fifth Amendment
because they were prepared voluntarily, but the court held that the act of
producing those documents was protected because of the testimonial effect
of production."' The court elaborated on how the documents could tend to
incriminate:
The production of a copy of Cates' 1040 forms would, for
example, be evidence that Cates possessed and failed to file
a tax return for the years in question. Producing copies of
W-2 forms would be evidence of evasion as he would be ac-
knowledging the existence and possession of such informa-
tion from which he should have determined his tax liability.
Deposit slips may well be similarly incriminating. In other
words, the compelled production of the documents sought
would be evidence of Cates' knowledge of his income and
failure to report and pay taxes on the same. Accordingly, the
Fifth Amendment privilege was properly asserted by Cates in
response to the document requests .... 27
In United States v. Wirenius, 273 the taxpayer properly asserted the Fifth
Amendment privilege to an IRS summons for all income records from 1988
to 1993.274 The taxpayer was not required to provide specific grounds of
fear of incrimination, but the court noted that one possible ground was will-
ful failure to file.275 Factors relevant to the court's determination that the
taxpayer's fear of incrimination was legitimate included attempts to place
the defendant under oath, the presence of a Criminal Investigation Division
agent, and an absence of evidence that the defendant's motive in resisting
was motivated politically.276
The difficulty in determining the types of documents that could, or
should, be protected from IRS subpoenas is reflective of the vicissitudes of
determining incriminatory aspects of other types of documents. In United
States v. Fox,277 the Second Circuit described a variety of ways in which
the documents at which a subpoena was directed could incriminate:
The IRS has no way of knowing from the face of Fox's
return whether he has records to support all of his claimed
271 Id. at 1192-93.
272 Id. at 1193.
273 No. CV 93-6786 JGD, 1994 WL 142394 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 1994).
274 Id. at *1.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 721 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 5:1
1996] DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS OF COMPLIANCE WITH IRS SUBPOENAS
business deductions; whether he possesses records that re-
flect unreported taxable income; or whether he possesses
records that evidence possible crimes committed in the
course of his sole proprietorship.278
Tax protestors often have valid reasons to fear incrimination. Merely
because these individuals are particularly bothersome to the IRS is not a valid
reason to remove their fundamental Fifth Amendment right. Moreover, in
certain cases, tax protestors are subject to a two-level sentencing increase.279
The punishment for violation of tax crimes is not trivial. For example,
taxpayer Joseph Klimek, after a conviction for failure to file a tax return, was
sentenced to two one-year prison terms and five years of probation. 2"
Other tax crimes and their associated penalties include fraud by counter-
feiting, altering, or removing stamps, with a fine of up to $10,000 and five
years imprisonment; ' willful failure to file, with a fine of up to $25,000
and a one-year prison sentence; 2 2 and attempt to evade taxes, with a fine of
up to $100,000 and a five-year prison sentence. 3 Moreover, there is a high
impetus for the DOJ and the IRS to punish tax offenders. For example, the
government is not allowed to recommend a sentence in a tax fraud case of no
period of imprisonment.' Allowing an individual to claim the privilege
against self-incrimination when the feared prosecution is for a misdemeanor
carrying a slight fine or jail term but not allowing it when faced with
substantially greater penalties is inconsistent and illogical.
The policies served by the Fifth Amendment also support the argument
that the current approach of the Ninth Circuit is unjustified. The Fifth Amend-
ment was significantly narrowed by the Supreme Court in the current implied-
admissions test, and few documents -emain out of governmental reach. The
Ninth Circuit's further narrowing of the protection erodes rather than protects
a sense of fair play between the individual and the state. Indeed, the exception
appears arbitrary and likely creates further hostility and distrust of the
government. Furthermore, the "trilemma" of self-accusation, perjury, or con-
tempt is perpetuated rather than avoided as an individual faced with an IRS
subpoena for potentially incriminating personal documents is faced with three
equally poor choices: commit perjury by stating that he does not have the
documents, subject himself to a contempt charge by not complying, or accuse
278 Id. at 38.
279 1 CRIMINAL TAx MANUAL, supra note 17, at 5-40.
United States v. Klimek, No. 91-4682, 1992 WL 99634 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 1992).
81 I.R.C. § 7208 (1994).
282 Id. at § 7203.
283 Id. at § 7201. For a more detailed discussion of tax crimes and their associated
penalties, see P.L. WHITE & C.M. OHANESIAN, GUIDE TO TAX PENALTIES UNDER THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (1996-97 ed. 1996).
'"1 1 CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL, supra note 17, at 2-27.
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himself of a crime. Finally, the third policy of protecting a private enclave,
which was substantially weakened under the implied-admissions test, is further
abridged by the tax-crime exception of the Ninth Circuit.
CONCLUSION
The current approach, both in the Ninth Circuit and in other circuits, fails
to consider the importance and stature of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Some cases make passing references to the importance of the
government's interest but certainly do not balance the fundamental right
involved with that interest. Because the privilege against self-incrimination is
a fundamental right, the current approach by the Ninth Circuit is misguided,
and it should demand a stronger, clearer compelling governmental interest
before abridging an individual's rights.
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